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1 Introduction 
The limited partnership might appear to be a Cinderella on the business organisations 
stage, having been comprehensively outcompeted since its introduction in the Limited 
Partnerships Act 1907 (LPA) by the limited company, and combining key disadvantages 
of both companies and general partnerships. In fact, it has been used consistently by a 
range of businesses, although its most high profile user currently is private equity. This 
use, together with private equity’s power and economic importance (and now its 
vulnerability post-Brexit), has led successive governments to attempt to reform limited 
partnership law for the benefit solely of private equity firms, most recently introducing 
substantial deregulation for the new “private fund limited partnership” (PFLP) variation 
on the limited partnership. The PFLP legislation exemplifies the influence of private 
equity, being rushed through Parliament despite a simultaneous government 
consultation on whether limited partnerships should be subjected to increased regulation 
to combat their use in criminal activities. 
 
This article first considers (in sections 2-3) why limited partnerships are used so 
extensively by private equity. It next examines (in sections 4-6) the extent to which 
private equity has shaped partnership legislation for its own purposes, and argues that 
these reforms pose risks to third parties, including creditors, investors and managers 
themselves, and the wider economy. It then argues (in sections 7-9) that the focus on 
private equity-inspired reforms has deprived actual and potential limited partnerships in 
other sectors of much needed reforms which would have benefited a wide range of 
businesses, and that at very least the private equity reforms should be extended to all 
types of limited partnership. Finally, it concludes by noting that in addition to these 
solutions, the government must resist legislative capture by private equity in the future.  
 
2 The limited partnership vehicle and its competitors 
The importance of the limited partnership as a business vehicle might seem surprising. 
Over the course of the 20th century, and continuing into the 21st century, it is the private 
limited company which has become the business vehicle of choice in the UK,1 although 
general partnerships formed under the Partnership Act 1890 continue to be an important 
part of the small business landscape, offering tax transparency combined with maximum 
flexibility, informality and privacy. Meanwhile, limited liability partnerships (LLPs) formed 
under the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 have established themselves as the 
vehicle of choice for professional firms, offering limited liability for all members, together 
with tax transparency, considerable flexibility and informality, and a greater degree of 
privacy than limited companies.  
 
The question that arises, then, is what place – if any – is left for limited partnerships. 
Long before its introduction, the UK was “almost alone, among the civilized countries of 
the world” in not having such a vehicle.2 In a foreshadowing of the capture of limited 
partnership legislation which has taken place in the early part of the 21st century, a 
contemporary commentator noted of the introduction of the LPA “How it happened that 
the interests back of this measure were able to secure from the present government the 
support necessary to its enactment, I don’t know”.3 However, by the time the UK finally 
introduced the limited partnership, its comparative advantage over a general partnership 
- limited liability for some partners - was of little importance when set against its 
comparative disadvantage in relation to a company which could offer limited liability to 
all members; in the same year as the LPA was enacted, the Companies Act 1907 
enhanced the existing option of incorporation with limited liability, which had been 
                                                 
1 There are 3.7 million registered private limited companies (only half estimated to be active), 421,000 general 
partnerships, 60,000 LLPs and 45,000 limited partnerships (Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 
‘Business Population Estimates for the UK and Regions 2016’ and Companies House, Statistical release 
Companies Register Activities 2016/2017).  
2 Sir Frederick Pollock, Essays in jurisprudence and ethics (Macmillan 1882) 100 and Francis M Burdick, 
‘Limited Partnership in America and England’ (1908) 6(7) Mich L Rev 525, 525. 
3 Burdick (n 2) 526.  
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available from 1855-1856,4 by reducing disclosure requirements for a private limited 
company and making it subject to less onerous rules than a public company. 
Furthermore, the limited partnership combines many of the disadvantages of a general 
partnership - such as the need to have at least some partners with unlimited personal 
liability and the lack of continuity on a change of such a partner - with those of a 
company or LLP - such as the need to register. In fact, as will be discussed in this article, 
special pleading by the investment industry has resulted in many investment 
partnerships being given reduced disclosure requirements, and some even benefiting 
from limited liability for all partners, but these are recent developments and have not 
been extended to other types of partnership (which is just one of the many harms 
caused to those other limited partnerships by the government’s focus on the demands of 
the investment industry).  
 
It might therefore have been expected that the limited partnership would wither on the 
vine, and indeed there were scarcely more than 1500 on the register for most of the 20th 
century.5  However, from the mid 1980s numbers increased rapidly, from 1500 in 1986, 
to 2000 in 1989, and currently 45,000.6  What, then, explains the persistence of the 
limited partnership as a viable and popular vehicle? It may be used to carry on “any 
trade, occupation or profession”,7 and can thus be used by any type of business. It offers 
to all a unique combination of privacy (principally since accounts are not publicly 
available), flexibility8 (since there is little regulation of the internal structure or 
agreement), tax transparency9 (because the partnership itself is not taxed) and - unlike 
a general partnership - limited partners with limited liability (so long as they do not 
engage in management of the business10).11 However, it is valued in particular by a 
number of niche sectors, including family businesses (due to its flexibility and tax 
transparency),12 tax planning (in particular to generate trading losses which can be set 
against a taxpayer’s other profits)13 and, most significantly, by private equity.14  
 
3 The dominance of the limited partnership vehicle by private equity 
                                                 
4 Limited Liability Act 1855 and Joint Stock Companies Act 1856; see also Timothy W Guinanne, Ron 
Harris, Naomi R Lamoreaux and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, ‘Ownership and Control in the Entrepreneurial Firm: 
An International History of Private Limited Companies’ (Dec 2007) Yale University Economic Growth Center 
Discussion Paper No. 959 pp703-705.  
5 ‘Companies: Eighteenth General Annual Report by the Board of Trade’ (London, 1909) and subsequent 
Annual Reports, variously pp6 or 7; ‘Companies: General Report by the Board of Trade for the Years 1939-
1945’ (London, 1947); ‘DTI: Companies in 1986-1987’ (1987) Table 17, and subsequent reports, Table G2 
(1987-1988 to 1989-1990) or Table E2 (1990-1991 onwards); ‘Companies House: Companies Register 
Activities 2006-2007’ et seq, Table E2 (2006-2007 to 2014-2015) or Table 1 (2015-2016 onwards).  The 
relevant reports for 1946-1985 do not include statistics for limited partnerships.  
6 Companies House, Statistical release Companies Register Activities 2016/2017 (n 1). 
7 Partnership Act, s 45.   
8 Joseph A McCahery and Erik PM Vermeulen, ’Limited partnership reform in the United Kingdom: a 
competitive, venture capital oriented business form’ (2004) 5(1) EBOR 61 at 71 and Julien Ruderman, ‘Private 
equity fund structuring’ (2007) 3 IBLJ 422, 425.  
9 Ruderman (n 8) at 424 and Jennnifer Payne, ‘Private Equity and its Regulation in Europe’ (2011) 12 EBOR 
559 at 570.  
10 LPA, s 6(1).   
11 BVCA and Travers Smith Braithwaite, ‘Limited Partnership Agreement: Explanatory Notes’ (October 2002) 1 
<http://www.bvca.co.uk/Portals/0/library/Files/StandardIndustryDocuments/LPAgreement.pdf> accessed 25 
September 2017 and Michael Bell and Clara Howard, ‘Investment Partnerships’ (2008) Tax J 23, 23.   
12 Arabella Saker and Corinne Staves, ‘Capital gains tax and partnerships’ (2010) 1 PCB 29, 31  
13 For example, R (on the application of de Silva and another) v Commissioners for HMRC [2016] EWCA Civ 40, 
[2016] STC and Reed v Young [1986] 1 WLR 649; see also JJ Henning, ‘Limited partnerships reform: Part 1’ 
(2011) Comp Law 178, 178. 
14 For example, Rose v Lynx Express Ltd [2003] EWHC 2937 Ch, [2004] BCC 714; see further the Law 
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Limited Partnerships Act 1907: a Joint Consultation Paper’ (Law 
Com CP No 161 and Scot Law Com DP No 118, 2001) paras 1.3 to 1.6 and Partnership Law (Law Com No.283 
and Scot Law Com No 192, 2003) paras 1.1 to 1.4, and D. Walker, ‘Guidelines for Disclosure and Transparency 
in Private Equity’ (November 2007) (the Walker Guidelines) 8–9 and 17, 
<http://privateequityreportinggroup.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/wwg_report_final.pdf> accessed 25 
September 2017. Part V of the Walker Guidelines was updated in 2014 and is available at 
<(http://privateequityreportinggroup.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/gmg_guidelines-jul14_final.pdf> 
accessed 25 September 2017. 
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The dramatic increase in the number of limited partnerships from the mid 1980s began 
immediately after confirmation by HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in 1987 that a 
limited partnership used as a venture capital investment fund would be treated as a 
partnership for tax purposes and thus as tax transparent.15 This confirmation was crucial 
to the use of limited partnerships by investment firms and, as will be discussed in the 
following sections of this article, the increase in such use has been accompanied by 
increasing pressure on, and policy and legislative capture of, the government by the 
private equity industry.  
 
Had some of the results of this capture (discussed in sections 4-6 of this article) – for 
example increased availability and extent of limited liability, reduced disclosure, and the 
provision of a ‘safe harbour’ list of activities in which limited partners can engage without 
losing their limited liability -  been extended to limited partnerships generally, it is likely 
that these numbers would have increased still further, with concomitant benefits to the 
wider economy and society. However, it is not just the failure to extend to all limited 
partnerships the benefits accorded to investment partnerships which leaves other limited 
partnerships (and potential limited partnerships) with an unnecessarily unsatisfactory 
business vehicle. It is also the damaging effects of the focus on private equity when 
reforming partnership law which, as discussed in sections 7-9  of this article, have meant 
that potentially valuable reforms have not been forthcoming, either because they are 
contrary to the interests of private equity, or because private equity is insufficiently 
interested in them and the government’s focus is on what private equity wants.  
 
The use of limited partnerships by private equity might seem surprising, not least 
because it could be argued that managing investments is not within either the spirit or 
the letter of the definition of a partnership in s1 of the Partnership Act as “carrying on 
business”. Indeed, the courts have ruled that investment management falls outwith s1 
where the investors have invested “once for all”.16 However, they have also suggested 
that “a repetition of investments” would be sufficient to satisfy the definition,17 while the 
Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission have emphasised that the definition 
of “business” is not exhaustive, merely “includ[ing]” any trade, occupation or profession, 
and argued that it clearly covers “investment activities as a commercial venture”.18  
Indeed, when they consulted on whether to rename the limited partnership vehicle in 
order to avoid confusion with the LLP, the fact that two of their three suggestions were 
“investment partnership” and “limited investment partnership” demonstrates the extent 
to which the limited partnership is considered to be synonymous with investment 
business.   
 
Nonetheless, UK limited partnerships are now the most commonly used structure for 
European (including UK) private equity, hedge funds and venture capital funds,19 as well 
as various other types of private fund.20 Although the term “venture capital” is used by 
                                                 
15 BVCA statement approved by the Inland Revenue and the DTI on the use of limited partnerships as venture 
capital investment funds’ (26 May 1987) 
<https://www.bvca.co.uk/Portals/0/library/Files/StandardIndustryDocuments/UseofLPsasPEVCfunds.pdf> 
accessed 25 September 2017, supplemented by the Memorandum of Understanding between the BVCA and 
Inland Revenue on the income tax treatment of Venture Capital and Private Equity Limited Partnerships and 
Carried Interest (25 July 2003) available at 
<https://www.bvca.co.uk/Portals/0/library/Files/StandardIndustryDocuments/PDF_2.pdf?ver=2013-06-14-
112836-650> accessed 25 September 2017.   
16 Smith v Anderson (1880) 15 Ch D 247, 279. 
17 Smith v Anderson (n 16) 279. 
18 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Partnership Law: a Joint Consultation Paper (Consultation 
Paper No 159 and Discussion Paper No 111, July 2000) para 5.10. 
19 Both private equity and hedge funds commonly used the limited partnership form, and although the 
investment strategies and the terms of the partnership tend to differ, the distinctions are often blurred (Payne 
(n 9) 564 and 566.  
20 Law Commissions, Partnership Law (n 14) para 19.2, Payne (n 9) 564 and the Financial Services Authority, 
‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory engagement’ (Discussion Paper 06/6, November 2006) para 
2.18.  
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the investment industry primarily to denote start-up funds for new ventures, particularly 
in the US, whereas “private equity” usually refers to the buying of existing companies 
and subsequent sale at a profit, the UK government has used the terms synonymously, 
along with other terms including “collective investment fund” and “private fund”.21 This 
use of limited partnerships has continued despite the advent of LLPs, which offer the 
additional advantages of separate legal personality and limited liability for all members, 
but also the disadvantages of greater regulation (resulting from the application of much 
of the companies legislation), including the publication of accounts and other 
information, and the Secretary of State’s powers to investigate.22  
 
Indeed, although “predict[ions of] the eclipse of the public corporation by private 
equity…have not been borne out in practice”,23 private equity funds being unsuitable for 
some types of investor since they are illiquid and normally require a substantial 
minimum investment, and for some types of investment since they are predicated on the 
investment having the potential for significant added value by management intervention, 
which is not always the case,24 private equity fund raising has at times outstripped public 
market capital raising in the UK.25 Institutional investors take a longer term view of 
returns and so the fact that shares in limited partnerships are not publicly tradable is 
less important,26 and private equity can be particularly beneficial for start-up businesses, 
as banks tend to be less keen to lend, and the public less keen to invest.27 Further, 
investment in private equity may be preferable to direct investment in a publicly traded 
company because funds are actively managed,28 and can yield superior returns,29 and 
partnerships do not have to pay commission to brokers to sell fund shares to the 
public.30 In addition, limited partner investors are permitted to vote on important issues 
such as changes to the agreement, whereas investors in public companies are frequently 
in a poor position to discipline management.31  
 
The majority of the literature on limited partnership structures and their use in the 
financial markets comes from the US,32 although much of it is relevant to the UK given 
the similarities in the limited partnership form in the two countries.33 There is relatively 
little literature on the influence of private equity on limited partnership reform, and in so 
far as this is recognised as an issue, the literature is largely supportive of this influence.  
However, there is another story to be told; that the empowerment of private equity is at 
the cost of harm (discussed in sections 7-9) to other types of business which use the 
limited partnership, and to the public interest because of its effects on the wider 
economy. 
 
It is well established that regulators often end up being “captured” by the firms they are 
supposed to discipline,34 and a similar phenomenon has been observed in relation to 
                                                 
21 Robert Peston, Who Runs Britain (Hodder & Stoughton 2008) p57.  
22 Joseph A McCahery and Erik PM, ‘The Evolution of Closely Held Business Forms in Europe’ (2001) J Corp L 
855, 867.  
23 Payne (n 9) 570.  
24 Frank Curtiss, Ida Levine and James Browning, ‘The Institutional Investor’s Role in “Responsible Ownership”’ 
in Iain MacNeil and Justin O’Brien (eds), The Future of Financial Regulation (Hart 2010) 310-311.  
25 Financial Services Authority (n 20).  
26 Michael Jensen ‘Eclipse of the Public Corporation’ (1989) 67 Harvard Bus Rev 61, 62.  
27 Leslie AJ Jeng and Philippe CW Wells, ‘The determinants of venture capital funding: evidence across 
countries’ (2000) 6 J Corp Finance 241, 245-247.  
28 Jensen (n 26) 62.  
29 Payne (n 9) 563.  
30 See further Carol J Loomis, ‘The Jones Nobody Keeps Up With’ Fortune (April 1966) (republished in Fortune 
Dec 29 2015).  
31 Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise (Harvard University Press 2000) 57.  
32 Jeng and Wells (n 27) 259 and 277. See further Loomis (n 30) on the development of private equity and 
hedge funds using the US limited partnership as a vehicle. 
33 Elspeth Berry, ‘Limited partnership law in the US and the UK: teaching an old dog new tricks?’ (2013) 2 JBL 
160.  
34 For example, George J Stigler, ‘The theory of economic regulation’ (1971) 2(1) Bell J Econ 3, Jean-Jacques 
Laffont and Jean Tirole, ‘The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture’ (1991) 
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legislators.35 This is particularly likely to occur where there is a concentration of 
economic and political power in the hands of an organised interest group36 or a wealthy 
elite37 which is thereby enabled to participate disproportionately in the legislative 
process,38 and where countervailing influences are absent or weak39 - both of which 
factors are present in the case of private equity and its influence on limited partnership 
law. Private equity includes both a wealthy elite of investors, and a well-financed interest 
group in the form of investment fund managers and their professional advisors, who can 
more easily monitor, promote or challenge decisions that will affect them. It is easier for 
government to work with them than against them, particularly where, as in the case of 
limited partnership reform, there is no organized countervailing influence and 
government activities are unlikely to be the subject of sustained (or indeed any) public 
attention.40 Indeed, in some circumstances the mindset of the policymakers can be 
captured (so-called “cognitive capture”).41 Further, both elected representatives and 
officials are often from economic or political elites, and not only bring their own beliefs 
and assumptions to bear on their decisions but may have personal or professional 
relationships with members of the interest groups,42  including the scenario of the 
“revolving door” where former policymakers subsequently obtain employment or 
consultancy with a member of an interest group.43 Thus the extensive use of limited 
partnerships by the private equity industry, combined with its political influence44 and 
much-vaunted contribution to the UK economy (estimated by the industry itself as 1% of 
GDP and tax revenue, 50,000 employees, and billions of funds raised annually45), has led 
to its capture of the policymakers and legislators.46 As will be discussed in detail in  
sections 4-6 of this article, this has driven the reform of limited partnership law for the 
benefit of private equity47 in the form, in particular, of the provisions of minimal liability 
to outsiders, maximum secrecy and favourable tax treatment. Yet the policies promoted 
by elites or interest groups are not those which the wider community (including the 
wider business community) would or do seek,48  and it cannot be assumed that they 
always possess superior wisdom,49 or provide unbiased information;50 such “[o]rganized 
                                                 
106(4) QJ Econ 1089, 1089-1091 and William J Novak, ‘A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture’ in Daniel 
Carpenter and David A Moss (eds), Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit 
it (Cambridge University Press 2014).  
35 For example, Bruce M Owen, ‘Communication Policy Reform, Interest Groups and Legislative Capture’ (2012) 
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) Discussion Paper No 11-006, 2 
<http://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/11-006.pdf> accessed 25 September 2017, Daniel 
Carpenter, ‘Detecting and Measuring Capture’ in Carpenter and Moss (n 34) and Kate Andrias, ‘Separations of 
Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and Balances (2015) 18 U Pa J Const L 419. 
36 Martin Gilens and Benjamin I Page, ‘Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and 
Average Citizens’ (2014) 12(3) Perspectives on Politics 564, 574.  
37 Andrias (n 35) 424, Jacob S Hacker and Paul Pierson, ‘Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political 
Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States’ (2010) 38(2) Politics & Society 
152, 175-177.  
38 Andrias (n 35) 425, Hacker and Pierson (n 37) 175-177.  
39 Andrias (n 35) 424-425 and 441, Hacker and Pierson (n 37) 179-180 and Rachel E Barkow, ‘Insulating 
Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design’ (2010) 89 Tex L Rev 15, 21-22.  
40 Andrias (n 35) 450 and 464, Hacker and Pierson (n 37) 172 and 173-174, Barkow (n 39) 22 and Laffont and 
Tirole (n 34) 1358-1359.  
41Joseph E Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality (Penguin 2013) pp59-60.  
42 Andrias (n 35) 447 and Laffont and Tirole (n 34) 1091.  
43 Barkow (n 39) 23 and Laffont and Tirole (n 34) 1091.  
44 For example, two members of the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee 
declared interests in limited partnerships, including at least one investment partnership (House of Lords 
Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, ‘17th Report of Session 2016-17’, Appendix 2).  
45 The Walker Guidelines (n 14) 7 and HM Treasury, ‘Proposal on using Legislative Reform Order to change 
partnership legislation for private equity investments: Consultation on draft legislation’ (July 2015) para 1.4.  
46 See Payne (n 9) 572 and Razeen Sappideen, ‘The regulation of hedge funds’ (2016) 7 JBL 537 on the 
insufficiency of regulation.  
47 Peston (n 21) pp56-64 and Chs 2 and 3 and Josh Kosman, The Buyout of America — How Private Equity Will 
Cause the Next Great Credit Crisis, (Penguin 2009) 160-164. 
48 Gilens and Page (n 36) 575 and John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press 1996) pp360-
361.  
49 Gilens and Page (n 36) 576.  
50 Lee Drutman, The Business of America is Lobbying (OUP 2015) pp40-42.  
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wealth has corrosive effects upon constitutional structure’s functional goals – namely to 
diffuse political power…in order to promote …democratic accountability”.51   
 
In fact, the economic importance of the financial sector can be overestimated; its 
benefits to the domestic economy are reduced because of its overseas investors and 
investment in overseas companies, and the industry contributes far more to London and 
the south east of England than the rest of the UK.52 Nonetheless, its importance to the 
economy undoubtedly “imposes political constraints on the extent to which tighter 
regulation leading to contracting and job losses can be countenanced”.53 Advocates of its 
influence note the importance of business organisation law per se to private equity and 
applaud the UK’s “responsive legislature” developing “its business organization law 
regime in response to demands in the marketplace”.54 They also cite similar influence 
exerted by professional services firms to obtain a UK LLP vehicle by threatening to make 
use of offshore LLP status,55 and this influence presumably also lies behind the curious 
omission of UK LLPs from the Partnerships (Accounts) Regulations 200856 (and the 
underlying Directives), which require partnerships to disclose their accounts if all their 
general partners have de facto limited liability because they are limited companies – but 
not if they are LLPs - or are unlimited companies/Scottish partnerships all of whose 
members/general partners are limited companies – but again not if they are LLPs. This 
influence is likely to be exerted even more strongly – as evidenced by the government’s 
revival in 2017 of its 2015 proposals for the PFLP - in the light of the sector’s potential 
vulnerability post-Brexit57 owing to its international nature, so that the UK limited 
partnership faces competition not only from domestic alternatives such as the UK 
company but from vehicles offered by other jurisdictions such as Luxembourg58 and 
Delaware.59  
 
As the following analysis of private equity’s capture of partnership policy and legislation 
will demonstrate, the government has no coherent rationale for its reforms to 
partnership law, other than pressure from the private equity industry. 
 
5 The capture of policy and legislation by private equity 1987-2013 
The earliest evidence of the capture by private equity of government policy60 on limited 
partnerships is provided by HMRC’s 1987 confirmation that, as discussed in section 3 of 
this article, a limited partnership used as a venture capital investment fund would be 
treated for tax purposes as tax transparent.61  A further example of policy capture is 
provided by the Law Commissions’ proposals in 2003 for a special limited partnership. 
This was prompted by their recommendation, as part of their proposals for the wholesale 
reform of general and limited partnership law, that partnerships be given separate legal 
personality.62 This risked overseas tax authorities ceasing to recognize UK partnerships 
as tax transparent, which would be a particular problem for private equity given its 
                                                 
51 Andrias (n 35) 426.  
52 House of Commons Library, ‘Financial services: contribution to the UK economy’ (Briefing Paper No 6193, 31 
March 2017) 6.  
53 Iain MacNeil, ‘The trajectory of regulatory reform in the UK in the wake of the financial crisis’ (2010) 11(4) 
EBOR 485, 484.  
54 McCahery and Vermeulen 2004 (n 8) 76, citing Brian R Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British 
Business Transformed (OUP 2008).  
55 McCahery and Vermeulen 2001 (n 22) 859 and 866-867.  
56 SI 2008/569.  
57 See, for example, the House of Lords European Union Committee, ‘Brexit: Financial Services’ (9th Report of 
Session 2016-2017, 15 December 2016) and ‘Brexit: the future of financial regulation and supervision’ (11th 
Report of Session 2017-2018, 27 January 2018) and the House of Commons Library ‘Brexit & financial services’ 
(Briefing Paper 07628, 9 March 2017).  
58 Ruderman (n9) 428-435 and HM Treasury, ‘Legislative Reform Order on the Limited Partnership [sic] Act: 
explanatory document’ (January 2017) paras 1.9 and 2.15.  
59 See further Ruderman (n 10) 426-427.  
60 Susan Webb Yackee, ‘Reconsidering Agency Capture During Regulatory Policymaking’ in Carpenter and Moss 
(n 34).  
61 BVCA statement approved by the Inland Revenue and the DTI (n 15).   
62 Law Commissions, Partnership Law (n 14) Chapter V.  
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overseas dimensions. The Law Commissions therefore proposed an additional type of 
limited partnership, the special limited partnership, which would continue to lack 
personality in order to ensure continuing tax transparency in other jurisdictions.63 It is 
notable that its use was not in terms restricted to any particular type of business, and so 
it could have benefited partnerships carrying on any type of business. However, again 
foreshadowing the capture of limited partnership legislation in subsequent years, the 
Law Commissions made it clear that it was targeted at private equity64 and 
commentators argued that, had the proposals for separate personality been adopted 
(which they have not been), the special limited partnership vehicle would have been 
“forced” upon UK lawmakers by “the importance of tax considerations in choosing a 
business form [and] the possible uncertainty about tax authorities’ reaction to the 
introduction of bestowing partnerships with legal entity status”.65  
 
Moving on from policy, private equity’s capture of partnership legislation was clearly 
demonstrated in 2008-2009 when, despite the government being unpersuaded by the 
Law Commissions’ case for the reform of partnership law generally, the Department for 
Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (BERR) nonetheless proposed a series of 
Legislative Reform Orders in 200866 and 200967 based largely (though not entirely) on 
the Law Commissions’ proposals but applicable to limited partnerships only. In doing so, 
it was responding to pressure in the form of the “strong economic case” put forward by 
private equity,68 whose chief interest was in limited rather than general partnerships. 
Although only three relatively minor reforms were enacted at the time, many of the 
other proposals reappeared in 2017 for the private fund partnerships only (discussed in 
section 6 of this article),69 including the introduction of a “white” list of activities which 
do not constitute management, the removal of limited partners’ duties and mandatory 
capital contributions, reduced disclosure, and winding up by the limited partners.  
 
A more significant example of legislative capture occurred in 2013, when the 
government introduced a new form of limited partnership, the partnership scheme, in 
response to three key private equity interests: favourable tax treatment, minimum 
liability and maximum secrecy. A partnership scheme allows investors to achieve 
economies of scale resulting from the pooling of assets while retaining the tax 
transparent treatment applicable to direct investment, and accommodates a range of 
institutional investors.70 It is defined by the Collective Investment in Transferable 
Securities (Contractual Scheme) Regulations71 (the Regulations) as a collective 
investment scheme72 that is a limited partnership but not a PFLP, but the Regulations 
give it a number of advantages over other limited partnerships by modifying the 
application of the LPA. While some modifications are inherent in the structure of a 
                                                 
63 Law Commissions, Partnership Law (n 14) paras 19.9-19.11, McCahery and Vermeulen 2004 (n 8) 79, and 
John Buckeridge, ‘Together clear’ Tax Adviser (1 October 2015).  
64 Law Commissions, Partnership Law (n 14) paras 19.2, 19.6 and 19.12.    
65 McCahery and Vermeulen 2004 (n 8) 79.   
66 BERR, ‘Reform of limited partnership law. Legislative Reform Order to repeal and replace the Limited 
Partnerships Act 1907: a consultation document’ (August 2008), pp12-13, 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090609003228/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file47577.pdf> 
accessed 25 September 2017.  
67 BERR, ‘The Legislative Reform (Limited Partnerships) Order 2009: Explanatory Document’ (June 2009) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090609043220/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file51586.pdf> 
accessed 25 September 2017.  
68 BERR 2008 (n 66) para 50.  
69 BERR 2008 (n 66) paras 40, 42-43.  Responses to the consultation (‘Responses to the 2008 draft reforms’) 
are archived at 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090413112312/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file50724.pdf> 
accessed 25 September 2017.  
70 HM Treasury, ‘Contractual schemes for collective investment: summary of consultation responses and 
Government response’ (March 2013) paras 3.7 and 3.12, and KPMG, ‘UK Authorised Contractual Schemes are 
making an impact’ (2014) < http://kpmg.co.uk/email/05May14/OM019684A/OM019684A_v1.5.html> 
accessed 25 September 2017.  
71 SI 2013/1388.  
72 Defined in FSMA, s 235.  
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partnership scheme (it can only have one general partner and, on formation, only one 
limited partner nominated by the general partner, and must have a partnership deed 
containing certain specified terms),73 others are not and instead reflect private equity’s 
interests. First, and most significantly, general partners have no personal liability to third 
parties for the debts of the partnership if the partnership is wound up under the 
Insolvency Act 1986,74 unlike general partners in an ordinary limited partnership.75 
Second, limited partners have no liability “for the debts or obligations of the firm beyond 
the amount of the partnership property which is available to the general partner to meet 
such debts or obligations”. They are thus, unlike limited partners in an ordinary limited 
partnership, not liable for any capital which they withdraw.76 Third, the Regulations 
expressly provide that the exercise of rights conferred on limited partners by contractual 
scheme rules drawn up by the Financial Conduct Authority will not constitute 
management,77 and thus will not render them personally liable for the partnership’s 
debts. This is the first (though, as discussed in section 5 b) of this article, not the last) 
instance of statutory protection of limited partner activity. Fourth, the identities of the 
limited partners (other than the nominated limited partner) and their capital 
contributions are not publicly disclosed,78 unlike in an ordinary limited partnership.  
 
This demonstrates legislative capture going even further than the industry itself requires, 
at least at present, since no such schemes have actually ever been set up.79 However, 
limited partnerships could have benefitted from the application of these reforms more 
widely. In particular, general partners would benefit from limited liability, but limited 
partners would also benefit from increased privacy, particularly where the business is 
one which might receive negative attention for engaging in legal but controversial 
activities such as conducting experiments on animals or testing genetically modified 
crops.  
 
5 The introduction of the PFLP in 2017 
The most recent evidence of private equity’s power and importance in relation to 
partnership legislation is provided by the Limited Partnerships (Private Fund Limited 
Partnerships) Order 2017 (PFLP LRO),80 which enacted most of BERR’s 2008-2009 
proposals but only for a new type of limited partnership, the PFLP. The government’s 
2015 consultation on the PFLP stated that it was “intended to ensure that the UK limited 
partnership remains the market standard structure for European private equity and 
venture capital funds as well as many other types of private fund in an increasingly 
competitive global market”.81 It is defined as a limited partnership, other than a 
partnership scheme,82 which is designated as a PFLP under s8(2) of the LPA. A limited 
partnership is defined as a relation between two or more persons carrying on business in 
common with a view of profit,83 at least one of whom is a general partner and one a 
limited partner,84 and it must be registered.85 Section 8(2) provides that the registrar 
must designate it as a PFLP if the application is made in accordance with s8D, which 
requires a PFLP to be constituted by an agreement in writing and be a collective 
                                                 
73 FSMA, s 235A(6) as inserted by the Contractual Scheme Regulations, Reg 3.  
74 Regs 16(3)(a) and 18.  
75 Partnership Act 1890, s 9. 
76 Reg 16(3)(b) and (c). 
77 Reg 16(4)(a). 
78 Reg 16(6)(a)-(b).  
79 HMRC, ‘Authorised contractual schemes: reducing tax complexity for investors: Summary of Responses’ 
(December 2016) para 2.1.  
80 SI 2017/514.  
81 HM Treasury 2015 (n 45) para 1.6 and Stephanie Biggs, ‘Private Equity: a practical guide’ (2008) 8(4) LIM 
247, 249.  
82 FSMA, s 235A(6)(aa).  
83 Partnership Act, s 1.  
84 LPA, s 4(2).   
85 LPA, s 5.   
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investment scheme.86 The latter requirement means that the regulatory regime 
established by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) applies, including 
having a manager who is an authorised person under the FSMA, and some elements in 
the private equity industry have criticised the requirement, both because the need to 
satisfy it at the time of registration could impose constraints on the initial structure of 
some funds which would otherwise only be structured as such a scheme at a later stage 
of the investment process,87 and because not all funds constitute such schemes at any 
stage: single investment vehicles, master funds (in which some investors participate, 
one of whom is another “feeder” vehicle in which the remaining investors participate88) 
and joint ventures are commonly used, yet these could fall outside the definition and 
thus outwith the PFLP rules.89  
 
However, the PFLP LRO largely accords with what private equity wanted.  It reduced the 
regulation of PFLPs as compared to ordinary limited partnerships and indeed was rushed 
through Parliament despite the inconsistency90 of deregulating PFLPs while the 
Department for Business, Enterprise and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) was simultaneously 
consulting on whether limited partnerships should be subjected to increased regulation 
to combat their use in criminal activities,91 and despite the House of Commons Select 
Committee which examined the PFLP LRO recommending (after hearing evidence from 
the author to this effect) that the government refrain from adopting the LRO until the 
responses to BEIS had been considered “to check for any significant or urgent concerns 
which would cast doubt on making the changes in [the LRO]”.92 The PFLP LRO not only 
adopted some of the same reforms of limited partnership law as partnership schemes, 
but went further in reducing regulation and reinforcing the economic power of private 
equity93 by extending those reforms. For example, it removed not merely the obligation 
to register limited partners’ capital contributions and their liability for withdrawn capital, 
but their obligation to contribute capital at all; and specified not merely one activity that 
would not constitute management and thus not result in the loss of limited liability, but 
an extensive list of such activities. Yet, as these reforms are only available to private 
equity, the PFLP does nothing to enhance the range of vehicles available to businesses 
generally. 
 
The most significant of the reforms to the limited partnership legislation introduced by 
the PFLP LRO, and the problems which they cause, will now be discussed in more detail. 
 
a) Removal of liability for limited partners in a PFLP 
The nature of a private equity partnership is such that the financial contributions of its 
partners are likely to be much more substantial than in other types of partnership, and 
so the exposure of those partners to liability is also likely to be higher. They therefore 
stand to benefit significantly from the exemption of PFLP limited partners from the 
requirements to contribute capital94 and register the amount at Companies House,95 and 
from the exemption from liability imposed for any withdrawn capital.96 The government’s 
rationale is that this reflects reality, because the obligation is commonly avoided in 
practice by making only a nominal capital contribution and the rest of the investment by 
way of loan, particularly where investors contemplate withdrawing part of their 
                                                 
86 As defined in s235 of the FSMA and ignoring any legislative exemptions of certain arrangements from the 
definition (LPA, s 8D(4)). 
87 Amelia Stawpert and Erik Jamieson, ‘Joining up the pieces’ (2015) 165(7662) NLJ 20, 21.  
88 Matthew Hudson, Funds: private equity, hedge and all core structures (2014 Wiley) 17-18.  
89 Stawpert and Jamieson (n 87) 20-21.  
90 Financial Reporting Council, ‘Written Evidence from the Financial Reporting Council (LRO 04): Legislative 
Reform Order (LRO) to change partnership legislation for private equity investments’ (February 2017). 
91 BEIS, ‘Review of Limited Partnership Law: call for evidence’ (16 January 2017).  
92 House of Commons Regulatory Reform Committee, ‘Draft Legislative Reform (Private Fund Limited 
Partnerships) Order 2017: Second Report of Session 2016-17’ (HC 1042, 6 March 2017) para 36.  
93 Wyn Grant, ‘Pressure Groups and British Politics’ (Macmillan 2000) 36 and 64-66.  
94 LPA, s 4(2A) and (2B).   
95 LPA, s 8A.   
96 LPA, s 4(3).   
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contribution before the end of the life of the fund.97 However, there is no evidence that 
capital requirements deter investors from becoming limited partners,98 and their removal 
could cause a number of problems.  
 
First, it disadvantages third party creditors of private equity funds, since one purpose of 
a compulsory capital contribution is to confirm limited partners’ liability to them.99 
Without this the firm will have fewer resources from which to meet its liabilities, which 
exposes it to the risk of insolvency, and hence transfers risk to its creditors and 
employees.100 Any loan which a PFLP limited partner makes instead will provide much 
less certainty.101  
 
Second, another intention behind the mandatory capital contribution is for limited 
partners to provide working capital, rather than merely a guarantee to contribute in the 
future,102 and the removal of the requirement clearly defeats this purpose.103  
 
Third, capital contributions are also intended to determine limited partners’ voting rights 
and shares in income and capital gains; whereas partner loans provide less certainty in 
this respect because of their variability.104  
 
Fourth, where a limited partner chooses to make a capital contribution, the removal of 
his liability for subsequent withdrawals is over generous when compared to private 
company shareholders. If a shareholder withdraws share capital through the purchase of 
those shares by the company itself, and is thus released from future liability, that 
withdrawal is subject to legal safeguards for other members and creditors including a 
statutory declaration of solvency and an annual limit on the total capital withdrawn.105 
Equivalent safeguards should therefore be applied to capital withdrawn by PFLP limited 
partners.106  
 
Fifth, reducing a limited partner’s liability may increase the moral hazard of him 
engaging in risky investment (or other) decisions for which he can avoid the costs, 
because he can withdraw capital without incurring liability to creditors107 (albeit that fund 
agreements usually only permit withdrawal of contributions prior to the end of the life of 
the fund in limited circumstances), or contribute his whole investment by way of a loan 
which is then repayable ahead of other partners’ capital contributions in a solvent 
winding up.108  
                                                 
97 In both Dickson v MacGregor [1992] SLCR 1 and MacFarlane v Falfield Investments Ltd [1998] SC 14 the 
limited partners had contributed £10 each. See HM Treasury 2015 (n 45) paras 3.13-3.14 and Alan Kelly, 
‘MacRoberts Insights: Bringing private fund limited partnerships into the 21st Century’ 28 July 2015 
<https://www.macroberts.com/bringing-private-fund-limited-partnerships-into-the-21st-century/> accessed 
25 September 2017.   
98 See further Richard DeFusco, Paul Shoemaker and Nancy Stara, ‘Controlling the Moral Hazard Created by 
Limited Liability’ (1996) 12(3) JABR 9, 16.  
99 Law Society of Scotland, ‘Consultation Response – Proposal on using Legislative Reform Order to change 
partnership legislation for private equity investments: Consultation on draft legislation’ (October 2015) 3-4 and 
Scott Kerr, Harper MacLeod Insights,’ Changing limited partnership legislation for private equity investments: 
consultation response’ (26 October 2015) <https://www.harpermacleod.co.uk/hm-
insights/2015/october/changing-limited-partnership-legislation-for-private-equity-investments-consultation-
response/> accessed 25 September 2017.  
100 DeFusco et al (n 98) 16.  
101 Law Society of Scotland (n 99) 3-4.  
102 Rayner and Co v Rhodes (1926) 24 Ll L Rep 25.     
103 Financial Reporting Council (n 90).  
104 Law Society of Scotland (n 99) 3-4.  
105 CA 2006, ss692 et seq.   
106 Berry 2013 (n 33) 442-443.  The Law Society of Scotland argued that capital should only be capable of 
being withdrawn if the PFLP is solvent (n 98) 3.  
107 DeFusco et al (n 98) 12-14, Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra and Thierry Tressel, ‘A fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and 
the Financial Crisis’ (IMF WP/09/287, 2009) 5-6 and 9-10 and Marie-Laure Djelic and Joel Bothello, ‘Limited 
Liability and its moral hazard implications: the systemic inscription of instability in contemporary capitalism’ 
(2013) 42 Theor Soc 589, 606-609.   
108 Partnership Act 1890, s 44.   
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Sixth, to the extent that removing the obligation to contribute capital benefits limited 
partners, it is unfair that only partners in private equity firms benefit, and not those in 
other sectors.   
 
Finally, the new provisions also lack clarity. Section 4(2B) of the LPA states that limited 
partners have no liability for the debts or obligations of the firm “beyond the amount of 
the partnership property which is available to the general partner to meet such debts or 
obligations”.109 This somewhat unclear phrase is borrowed from the provisions on 
partnership schemes,110 whose limited partners are obliged to make a capital 
contribution and so their liability is clearly limited to their actual capital contribution. In 
contrast, PFLP limited partners are not obliged to make a capital contribution at all,111 
and it is therefore unclear what their liability is. HM Treasury has explained that the 
phrase includes any undrawn capital contribution, but this is not clear from the 
legislation and nor is whether it includes undrawn profit shares,112 even though this 
could have a considerable impact on limited partners and creditors, particularly where a 
PFLP only allows the withdrawal of profits when the partnership term expires. 
 
b) Increased role in management for limited partners in a PFLP 
PFLP limited partners who want to take an active role in managing their investments or 
other aspects of the firm are subject to the prohibition in s6 of the LPA on limited 
partners taking part in management of the partnership business, and to the 
accompanying sanction of personal liability for the firm’s debts and obligations. This 
sanction could effectively transfer to a PFLP limited partner’s personal assets the liability 
from which his investment is now protected by the removal of the mandatory capital 
contribution from PFLP limited partners. However, the PFLP reforms have reduced the 
risk of this occurring by providing that a PFLP limited partner is not to be regarded as 
taking part in management to the extent that he engages in anything listed as a 
permitted activity in s6A of the LPA. He will therefore be able to engage in these 
activities without losing his limited liability. Many of the activities listed reflects a similar 
list provided in the United States’ Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) of 1976 as 
amended in 1985, and it remains to be seen whether this is the start of a move towards 
the current US position; ULPA 2001 now removes any sanction for limited partners 
taking part in management.  
 
It is true that the management prohibition has been criticised,113 and it has been argued 
investors want more active involvement in the monitoring and control of their 
portfolios.114 However, the LPA already enables limited partners to monitor 
management,115 and the reforms give rise to a number of problems. 
 
First, such a list “might blur the different roles of the limited partner and the general 
partner”, as well as thereby reducing the justification for limited liability; the Law 
Commissions rejected “an extensive list” on this ground, even though they favoured a 
list in principle for all limited partnerships.116  
 
                                                 
109 Limited Partnerships Act 1907, s 4(2B)(b).  
110 Contractual Scheme Regulations, Reg 16(3)(b). 
111 Limited Partnerships Act 1907, s 4(2B)(a).  
112 Reed v Young [1986] STC 285, Mark Blackett-Ord and Sarah Haren, Partnership Law (5th edn, Bloomsbury 
2015) para 24.5 and Roderick I’Anson Banks (ed), Lindley & Banks on Partnership (19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2010) paras 31-10 and 31-11.   
113 Gillespie Macandrew, ‘Responses to the 2008 draft reforms’ (n 69). 
114 James Burdett, Priya Kumar and Zöe Pople, ‘The limited partnership: a fresh look at a trusted model’ (2013) 
27(4) PLC, internet, 10.  
115 LPA, s 6(5) and Hansmann (n 31) 36.  
116 Law Commissions, Partnership Law (n 14) para 17.15.  
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Second, like the removal of liability for capital contributions, the reduction in the scope 
of the management prohibition, and thus of the scope for personal liability to be 
imposed, potentially gives rise to moral hazard.117  
 
Third, although the courts have raised concerns about the difficult distinctions to be 
drawn as to what constitutes management,118 the list goes beyond merely clarifying the 
boundaries of the management prohibition in order to provide legal certainty. Instead, it 
modifies the prohibition by excluding core management activities which should properly 
be caught by the prohibition.119 These include taking part in a decision about the 
incurring of partnership debt120 or whether to dispose of the partnership business or to 
acquire another business,121  and “advising with a general partner about the affairs of 
the partnership”122 even though in Inversiones Frieira SL and another v Colyzeo 
Investors II LP and another123 the court held that scrutinising and commenting on 
business decisions would constitute management. As the court noted in Certain Limited 
Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LP (a firm) v Henderson PFI Secondary 
Fund II LP (a firm) and others, s6 LPA “shows just how limited the limited partner’s 
involvement can be without so participating [in management]”.124  
 
Finally, to the extent that the courts have raised concerns about grey areas in what 
constitutes participation in management, guidance in the form of a ‘safe harbour’ list 
would be welcome in the interests of providing legal certainty to all limited partners, not 
just those in a PFLP. Indeed, the House of Commons Select Committee which examined 
the PFLP LRO concluded that the government should consider introducing such a list for 
all limited partnerships.125  
 
 
c) Reduced duties for limited partners in a PFLP 
Private equity successfully argued that since limited partners often invest in more than 
one fund, and these funds may finance competing businesses, PFLP limited partners 
should be exempted from the two statutory duties which apply to other limited 
partners126 - to disclose to the other partners true accounts and full information 
concerning the business,127 and to account for profits made by a competing business.128 
However, it is not obvious why limited partners should not be subject to these duties;129 
it is well established that partners are in a fiduciary relationship,130 and that fiduciaries 
                                                 
117 Djelic and Bothello (n 107) 606-609.  
118 Inversiones Frieira SL and another v Colyzeo Investors II LP and another [2011] EWHC 1762 (Ch), [2012] 
Bus LR 1136 and Certain Limited Partners in Henderson PFI Secondary Fund II LP (a firm) v Henderson PFI 
Secondary Fund II LP (a firm) and others [2012] EWHC 3259 (Comm), [2013] QB 934.  
119 Stawpert and Jamieson (n 87) 21, the Law Society of Scotland (n 99) 2-3, Berry 2013 (n 33) 177, and the 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) and the Chancery Bar Association and Gillespie 
Macandrew in their respective ‘Responses to the 2008 draft reforms’ (n 69).  
120 LPA, s 6A(2)(n)(v) and (vi). The author previously considered that the importance of advising on or 
overseeing investment decisions made their inclusion desirable (Elspeth Deards [Berry], ‘Limited Partnerships: 
limited reforms?’ (2003) JBL 435, 442), but on reflection it is considered that these constitute management 
activities, particularly where the business of the firm is investment (Berry 2013 (n 33) 177.   
121 LPA, s 6A(2)(n)(i).  See Law Society of Scotland (n 99) 2-3.   
122 LPA, Art 6A(2)(i); see Law Society of Scotland (n 99) 3.   
123 Inversiones (n 118).  
124 Henderson (n 118) [62].   
125 House of Commons Regulatory Reform Committee, ‘Draft Legislative Reform (Private Fund Limited 
Partnerships) Order 2017: Second Report of Session 2016-17’ (HC 1042, 6 March 2017) at para 39.  
126 LPA, s 6(5)(f).  
127 Partnership Act, s 28.  
128 Partnership Act, s 30.  
129 BVCA, ‘BVCA response to HM Treasury’s proposal on using a Legislative Reform Order to change partnership 
legislation for private equity investments’ (5 October 2015) p12 
<http://www.bvca.co.uk/Portals/0/library/Files/Government%20Submissions/151005%20BVCA%20response%
20to%20HMT%20consultation%20on%20LP%20reform.pdf> accessed 25 September 2017.   
130 Thompson’s Trustee in Bankruptcy v Heaton [1974] 1 WLR 605 (Ch) and the Law Commission, Fiduciary 
Duties of Investment Intermediaries (Law Com No 350, 2014) para 3.15.  
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owe a duty of loyalty131 which includes avoiding a conflict of interest and not making 
unauthorised profits by virtue of their fiduciary status.132 It is also well established that 
trustees are fiduciaries, and some or all partners in a firm are likely to hold partnership 
property as trustees for all partners beneficially.133 Although the Explanatory Notes to 
the original PFLP consultation134 asserted that limited partners should be able to 
passively invest in a number of competing funds, the new list of permitted activities 
enables them to become more active in such investments. Since they could thereby 
influence the activities of the firm, it may be inappropriate in some circumstances for 
them to have conflicting interests or fail to disclose information.135  It is inconsistent for 
limited partners to simultaneously gain greater rights to become involved in managing 
the business yet be relieved of duties on grounds of their alleged lack of involvement.  
Private equity partnerships often have an advisory board composed of limited partners, 
who are involved in decisionmaking, for example consenting to or reviewing decisions 
made by the general partner, in respect of matters in which they have competing 
interests through their other investments,136 and commentators have warned that the 
potential for conflicts of interest to adversely affect a firm’s finances has been 
overlooked by regulators.137  
 
It may also be that the reform is either an unnecessary complication of the LPA, or 
ineffective. The statutory duties only apply in the absence of contrary agreement, and 
therefore a partnership which wishes to exempt its partners may do so.  Although it has 
been argued that parties may be reluctant to contract out of fiduciary duties even where 
they are merely default rules,138 it is common for a limited partnership agreement to 
include a provision allowing limited partners to engage in the same or similar business 
activities without being liable to account for profits derived for them.139 Alternatively, the 
reform may be ineffective, since equivalent duties may continue to apply as part of the 
common law duty of good faith which all partners owe each other.140 In BBGP Managing 
General Partner Ltd and others v Babcock & Brown Global Partners the court noted that 
aside from any specific contractual obligations, “each of the partners owed to the other a 
duty of honesty and good faith in relation to the partnership business (including a duty 
not to use for personal advantage powers which are conferred as partner). The principle 
applies as much to limited partnerships as to other partnerships”.141  
 
Finally, insofar as the exemption of limited partners from some of the duties contained in 
the LPA is indeed effective, it is unfair to bestow on PFLP limited partners but not on 
those in other businesses the benefit of removing the need to negotiate limitations on 
their duties in their partnership agreement. Indeed, the same reform was proposed by 
the government in 2008 for all limited partnerships.142   
 
d) Reduced disclosure by PFLPs 
                                                 
131 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 (CA) 18 (Millett LJ) and the Law Commission, 
Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries (n 130) para 3.28.  
132 Thompson’s Trustee (n 130) and the Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries (n 
126) para 3.15.  
133 Re Hallett’s Estate (1880) 13 Ch D 696 and the Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment 
Intermediaries Law (n 130) para 3.15.   
134 HM Treasury 2015 (n 45) para 3.26.  
135 Financial Services Authority (n 20) 73, Technical Committee of the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), ‘Private Equity Conflicts of Interest: Final Report (FR11/10 Nov 2010) pp12 and 14 and 
David Gregory, ‘Private Equity and financial stability’ (2013) Bank of England Q1 Quarterly Bulletin 38, 41.   
136 Burdett et al (n 114) 15-16.  
137 MacNeil 2010 (n 51) 523.  
138 McCahery and Vermeulen 2004 (n 8) 82-83.   
139 Burdett et al (n 113) p10.  
140 Const v Harris (1824) T&R 496, 37 ER 1191.    
141 [2010] EWHC 2176 (Ch), [2011] Ch 296, para 11.  
142 Draft Legislative Reform (Limited Partnerships) Order 2009, Annex to BERR 2008 (n 66), s44H(2) and (3).  
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The private equity industry is noted for its secrecy143 and has accordingly ensured that, 
unlike ordinary limited partnerships, PFLPs do not need to register the nature of the 
business, any term or the conditions on which the PFLP exists or, the amount of any 
capital contributed by the limited partners.144 Designation as a PFLP may provide as 
much information about the nature of the business as would otherwise be registered, but 
any term or conditions on which it exists and any capital contributed by a limited partner 
is relevant to the assessment of its financial viability by potential creditors,145 and this 
reform is therefore regrettable. The importance of disclosure by those who trade with 
limited liability, such as limited partners, has frequently been emphasised by the courts.  
In Re Grayan Building Services Ltd (In Liquidation)146 the court stated that  
 
The concept of limited liability….carries with it the discipline that those who avail 
themselves of those privileges must….abide by the regulatory rules and 
disciplines in place to protect creditors and shareholders. 
 
In Sebry v Companies House147 the court noted that the requirement to supply 
information to Companies House was part of the basis on which limited liability was 
granted, and cited the Registrar’s evidence to the Business, Enterprise, and Regulatory 
Reform Committee that  
 
In order to allow business access to easy and readily accessible information, and 
in order to allow people to assess the performance of companies and assess the 
track record of directors in companies, in return for that limited liability status 
that information is provided. That enables people to make informed decisions 
about who they want to do business with, who they want to work with as their 
clients, who they want to work with as suppliers and who indeed they believe to 
have good credit. 
 
This list of interested parties is not exhaustive and also includes, for example, employees 
and landlords. The EU Court of Justice has similarly emphasised that the purpose of 
corporate disclosure is “to protect in particular the interests of third parties….since the 
only safeguards [firms] offer to third parties are their assets”.148 Although these 
statements concerned businesses whose members all had limited liability, and could 
apply with less force where some members have personal liability, a limited partnership 
may have only one such member and that member may (and in private equity firms will) 
be a limited company or LLP and hence in practice have limited liability.  
 
The disclosure requirements of the LPA therefore remain important to third parties and, 
contrary to some assertions,149 are not onerous150 but a proportionate response to the 
availability of limited liability. Indeed, there is a case to be made that they are too 
minimal: the Walker Guidelines151 suggest that private equity firms should publish an 
annual review on their general approach including details of their limited partners by 
type and location of investor; and BEIS is currently investigating the extent to which 
Scottish limited partnerships (which have the advantage over English and Welsh 
partnerships of separate legal personality152) are being used for criminal purposes 
                                                 
143 The Walker Guidelines (n 14) 17-18.  
144 LPA, ss8A and 9 of the LPA.    
145 Response of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) (Responses to the 2008 draft 
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146 [1995] Ch 241, 257.  
147 [2015] EWHC 115 (QB), [2015] BCC 236 [51].  
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49. 
149 Christopher Morris ‘The private fund limited partnership: the reform company lawyers have been waiting 
for?’ (2017) 38(6) Co Law 192, 193.  
150 Burdick (n 2) 526. 
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because of their relative secrecy.153 It has been alleged that the limited partnership 
vehicle is being used to hide such activities as money laundering, terrorist financing and 
selling deceptive financial products,154 and Transparency International has published a 
damning report on their use and made a number of urgent recommendations for reform, 
including the verification of registered information and the increase of such 
information.155 The government has already adopted one recommendation, the extension 
to Scotland (but not England and Wales) of the requirement already applicable to 
companies and LLPs to register details of persons with significant influence over the 
partnership or its partners,156 but there are already substantial criticisms of this regime 
which have not been addressed.157 Furthermore, the other key element of partnership 
secrecy is the non-disclosure of accounts. Even in the rare circumstances when 
disclosure is mandated by the Partnerships (Accounts) Regulations 2008 - because all 
general partners effectively have limited liability (discussed above) and so their 
employees, investors and creditors have the same interest in the information as those of 
publicly traded companies, which have to disclose their accounts at Companies House158 
- it is difficult to locate the accounts because they are required to be disclosed by the 
partners, not by the partnership directly, and there is no mechanism to indicate on the 
partnership’s registered details that such accounts are available or where they are 
available.  
 
As with the partnership scheme discussed at section 4 above, to the extent that secrecy 
is attractive to legitimate businesses, it is unfair that only partners in private equity firms 
benefit, and not those in other sectors.   
 
e) Limited partners enabled to wind up the partnership 
Limited partners in ordinary limited partnerships are not entitled to wind up the 
partnership even where there are no general partners, unless they obtain a court 
order.159 The government’s 2008-2009 proposals recognised that this was a problem for 
all limited partnerships,160 but only private equity exerted sufficient influence to achieve 
a solution for its firms and so only PFLP limited partners can appoint a third party to 
conduct the winding up without a court order.161  
 
6 Future tax reforms for investment partnerships 
The final evidence of the influence of private equity, and in particular its interest in 
achieving favourable tax treatment, is provided by recent government proposals on 
partnership taxation, which indicate that it is not pursuing its original proposal to require 
partnerships to include in their return the ultimate recipients of partnership property 
where connected partnerships are utilised,162 structures which are more likely to be used 
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by the investment industry. They also include legislative amendments designed solely for 
investment partnerships, which would mitigate administrative problems where there are 
a large number of partners, many of whom are non-UK resident or not taxable 
entities,163 by removing the obligation to report the full details of  partners in the 
partnership tax return from those partnerships which are already subject to the OECD 
Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information.  
 
These tax reforms are in substance only relevant to investment partnerships, and HMRC 
should not be distracted by the influence of such partnerships but instead should 
consider the possibility of tax reforms (including simplification) which would be useful to 
all partnerships.164  However, the dangers of such distractions are not limited to tax law, 
as the following section will demonstrate.  
 
7 Private equity capture has meant that reforms needed by other business 
partnerships have not been made 
The focus on private equity when reforming partnership law, as evidenced above, is 
damaging because it has meant that other potentially valuable reforms to partnership 
law have not been made, either because they are contrary to the interests of private 
equity, or because private equity has insufficient interest in them and the government’s 
focus is limited to what private equity wants. Further, to add insult to injury, the reforms 
made for the benefit of private equity partnerships have not been made available to the 
many other limited partnerships, such as family partnerships or indeed investment 
partnerships which do not qualify as partnership schemes or PFLPs.165 As commentators 
noted when the government put forward legislation in 2008 to enact many of the Law 
Commissions’ proposals, but only for limited partnerships,  
 
if improvement is necessary, why is it to be limited to limited partnerships? The 
same fundamental issues apply to general partnerships. Do not these also merit 
attention? Or have limited partnerships been chosen because although so much 
fewer in number than are general partnerships, they are the favoured business 
organisation of the rich and powerful and not of ordinary people operating small 
businesses.166 
 
Similar comments might be made of partnership schemes and PFLPs as compared to 
ordinary limited partnerships.  
 
These three categories of missed reforms will now be considered in more detail.   
 
a) Reforms which would be contrary to the interests of private equity: 
separate legal personality and its consequences 
The introduction of separate personality, as recommended by the Law Commissions in 
2003,167 would be highly useful for partnerships generally, providing a simple and 
comprehensive solution to various problems which result from its absence, including 
continuity on a change of partner, ownership and transfer of partnership property, and 
litigation by or against the firm.168 Currently, at best, English partnerships have to solve 
these problems in somewhat complex (and thus often expensive) ways; at worst, they 
fail to solve them. It would also provide a more accurate reflection of commercial reality, 
greater conceptual clarity, and consistency with developments in other jurisdictions such 
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as the US.169 However, as discussed above, separate personality could lead overseas 
authorities to disregard the tax transparency of private equity partnerships,170 and it was 
rejected by the government despite considerable support for the Law Commissions’ 
recommendation. More recently, the government claimed that it was not possible to 
introduce separate personality for PFLPs because further work was required to explore 
the implications and necessary legislative changes;171 but these were comprehensively 
examined by the Law Commissions and it seems unlikely that further analysis will 
produce a different conclusion to the potential incompatibility of separate personality and 
tax transparency, especially as any future adoption of the EU’s recommendation for 
mutual recognition of the tax status of a fund structure which is fiscally transparent in its 
home Member State172 is unlikely to apply to the UK.  
 
b) Reforms which are of insufficient interest to private equity 
Although private equity has no particular objection to the following important reforms, 
they have not been enacted because the government has limited legislative capacity 
and, so far as partnerships are concerned, it has been allocated to private equity. The 
same criticism may be made of the tax proposals set out at section 9 above and the 
simultaneous failure to simply partnership taxation generally. 
 
First, all partnerships (including PFLPs), dissolve automatically in the absence of prior 
contrary agreement, on the giving of notice of retirement by a general partner173 or on 
his death or bankruptcy.174 Unintended dissolution can have significant adverse 
consequences, particularly in relation to the firm’s finances and its contracts with third 
parties, and so all partnerships would benefit from the reversal of the legislative 
presumptions to enable continuity.175 In addition, although a limited partnership is 
required to have at least one general and one limited partner,176 the LPA does not make 
clear whether departure of the last limited or general partner will automatically dissolve 
the partnership and, if the absence of any general partner does not cause dissolution, 
whether the limited partners retain their limited liability in such circumstances. If they 
do, creditors are deprived of recourse to the personal assets of any partner,177 and 
therefore the imposition of unlimited liability is to be preferred; if this is a concern to the 
limited partners, they can ensure that the partnership agreement provides for automatic 
dissolution.  
 
A second potential reform from which attention has been diverted by the demands of 
private equity is the introduction of a model partnership agreement, which would reduce 
the costs of drawing up an agreement and the risk of having an incomplete or no 
agreement.178 This would benefit all partnerships, but particularly those with less 
expertise or fewer financial resources, and different models could be provided for general 
and limited partnerships, as has been done for different types of company.179 Even 
partnerships which chose to draft their own agreement could benefit, since the quality of 
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such agreements could be improved – and thus the likelihood of disputes, and their 
complexity, diminished - because there is a natural tendency to adhere to default 
options.180  
 
Third, and similarly, making the limited partnership legislation more transparent and 
accessible is of considerable interest to small businesses without resources for extensive 
professional advice,181 but less to private equity. For example, the consolidation of all the 
legislation governing UK limited partnerships – that is to say, the Partnership Act and the 
LPA - into a single statute would make it easier (and so quicker and cheaper) for 
intending or actual partners and their advisors to access and understand the relevant 
provisions and might encourage wider take up of the limited partnership. Indeed, this 
was originally proposed by the Law Commissions and the government,182 but the latter 
subsequently decided instead to amend the LPA on an incremental basis, so that the 
most widely supported reforms could be adopted as soon as possible while discussion 
continued on the more controversial issues.183 Further, although the integration of the 
PFLP reforms into the LPA makes the legislative framework for PFLPs clearer than if 
separate legislation, requiring cross references to the LPA which itself cross refers to the 
Partnership Act, had been adopted, it has made the LPA longer and much less clear for 
other limited partnerships.  
 
c) Private equity reforms which would benefit other partnerships have not 
been applied more generally 
As argued above, most of the partnership scheme and PFLP reforms are inappropriate 
because they pose risks to third parties and the wider economy and, in some 
circumstances, to partners themselves. However, some do not (for example, enabling 
limited partners to wind up the partnership); and, in any event, as has been argued in 
relation to the reforms discussed in sections 4-6 of this article, it is invidious that 
reforms have been adopted which confer benefits only on some limited partnerships.184 
Indeed, many of them were originally proposed by the Law Commissions and/or the 
government for all limited partnerships, and the House of Commons Select Committee 
which examined the PFLP LRO concluded that a “safe harbour” list should be introduced 
for all limited partnerships.185  
 
The government’s argument that the PFLP reforms could not be applied more generally 
without consultation is unconvincing because almost identical proposals have been the 
subject of relatively recent consultations, both by the Law Commissions and the 
government itself and, in any event, the PFLP consultation could easily have been 
extended to limited partnerships generally and the government should not be able to 
plead its own failure in this respect.  It is difficult to resist the conclusion that lobbying 
by a special interest group – namely the private equity firms and those who advise 
them186 - has produced bespoke legislation despite previous criticisms of substantially 
similar proposals.  
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8 The problems for private equity itself 
The capture of partnership law and policy by private equity is not just a problem for 
other businesses: reduced regulation is not necessarily beneficial even for private equity 
itself.187 The Financial Conduct Authority has found that price competition is weak, funds 
do not outperform their own benchmarks after taking fees into account, and fund 
objectives and charges are unclear.188 Decisions taken towards the end of the fund’s life 
can be damagingly short term, for example hoarding cash flow or cutting investment.189 
The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive,190 which restricts the marketing of 
private equity so that fund managers must be authorised and meet minimal capital 
requirements, has significant exemptions, and in any event the long-term future of the 
corresponding UK legislation191 must be in doubt post-Brexit. Conflicts of interest can 
arise where a fund manager itself participates in transactions and “cherry picks” its 
investments,192 or is also the director of a company owned by the fund,193 or where 
partners are involved in the running of the portfolio company or the fund management 
vehicle;194 or where management fees paid to general partners are not sufficiently 
sensitive to performance, or are linked to overall profit and thus incentivise excessive 
borrowing.195  Although HM Treasury suggested that PFLPs would only involve 
sophisticated investors,196 there is contrary evidence that in fact limited partners can fall 
victim to incompetence197 or unscrupulous behaviour by private equity firms.198 As one 
commentator noted in relation to the alleged sophistication,  
 
Until quite recently, regulators thought banks were highly sophisticated and treated 
them accordingly. The crisis has shown that banks cannot be relied on to behave 
wisely, and the costs are high. Why should regulators still assume that they can rely 
on “sophisticated investors” as a group? As a matter of urgency, policymakers need to 
address the issue of the “sophisticated investor”. Thirty years of private equity help to 
show why.199  
 
For example, in The Connaught Income Fund, Series 1 (in liquidation) v Capita Financial 
Managers Limited and Blue Gate Capital Limited200 investors who had suffered losses in 
an unregulated investment scheme operated through a limited partnership successfully 
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sued the scheme operators for promoting the scheme unlawfully and marketing it in a 
misleading manner. Lack of transparency poses risks to less experienced and well-
resourced investors,201 since valuations of unquoted investments are subjective and 
general partners are inclined to overestimate;202 but it also leaves “a consequent gap in 
the ability of institutional investors in handling the governance, monitoring and 
engagement issues….This is not good either for the industry itself or for investors.”203 
Even a commentator who suggested that “[t]oo much regulation could cause the private 
equity industry to migrate to more lightly regulated jurisdictions”, also warned that “too 
little regulation could raise issues of market confidence”.204 The Walker Guidelines 
emphasised “the priority of improved reporting by private equity…. above all as a means 
of promoting better understanding of….its actual and potential impact on the UK 
economy” and the need for “timely and effective communication with non-owner 
stakeholders” especially employees of the portfolio company.205 However, as noted 
above, accounts of the private equity firms themselves remain largely hidden; investors 
may receive more extensive and detailed information about the funds than investors in 
public companies,206 but this is a matter for private negotiation and cannot be 
guaranteed, and in any event the information is not available to employees, suppliers or 
the wider public.  
 
9  The problems caused to the wider economy 
In addition to being damaging other businesses and indeed to private equity itself, the 
influence of private equity is contrary to the public interest because it poses significant 
risks to economic and financial stability, including by reducing efficiency and 
distributional equity.207  Its influence is part of the much-criticised “financialisation” of 
the UK economy,208 in the sense of profits being sought from financial rather than 
productive channels, in particular from creating and trading in financial property,209 and 
the increasing role of financial institutions and actors in the economy210 – including their 
role in legislative capture211 and associated reduction in regulation.212 Concerns have 
been expressed not only about the dominance of private equity in the run-up to the 
financial crisis of 2008, and its low levels of regulation compared to publicly traded 
companies, particularly as regards transparency and disclosure,213 but also about its 
capacity to endanger financial stability in the future.214 The allocation of economic risk is 
often unclear in private equity, both because the complexity of the financial structures 
used obscures exposure to risk, and because their global nature means that different 
insolvency regimes may apply.215 Private equity owned companies are often highly 
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leveraged,216 which may pose greater risks of insolvency,217 and leverage and asset 
stripping can adversely affect employees, through destruction of jobs218 or company 
pensions;219 it is estimated that 19% of private sector employees220 and 8% of the total 
workforce work for private equity-backed businesses.221 Such behaviour can also affect 
suppliers222 and the wider public.223 Private equity regulation and accountability is thus 
“imperative for the perceived social legitimacy of private equity in the wake of the 
acquisition by private equity of rights of ownership and control of major UK 
companies”.224 
 
10 Conclusion 
Private equity’s influence on partnership law and the resulting distortion of the 
development of the law is a questionable victory for private equity itself, because 
deregulation can be harmful both to managing and investing partners, but it is a definite 
disaster for other partnerships, actual and potential. The Law Commissions concluded 
that a range of reforms were necessary to preserve partnership as a flexible, informal 
and private business vehicle and to provide a modern law of partnership readily 
understandable by advisers and clients;225 and the failure to reform partnership law as it 
applies to non-private equity businesses is harmful because those businesses could fail 
to flourish (and new businesses fail to form) as they might had the reforms been 
adopted. Both the deregulation of private equity partnerships and the lack of wider 
reforms are likely also to cause harm to the wider economy.  
 
It is unfortunate that the time and effort put into limited partnership reform have not 
produced greater gains for the range of businesses which the LPA was originally intended 
to support.226 While lobbying can facilitate informed decisionmaking by a legislator,227 
lobbying to affect the regulatory environment may result in moral hazard and the range 
of other harms discussed in this article. In contrast, the quality of law making could be 
maximised by taking into account a full range of affected interests228 – so not just 
private equity managers and advisors, or even investors, but the wider business 
community. Had such stakeholders been able to lobby as effectively as private equity, 
the business community could have benefited not only from the missed reforms 
discussed above, but from others put forward by the Law Commissions and still others to 
which wider consultation might have given rise. 
 
The immediate legislative solutions are as follows. First, to the extent that administrative 
and financial burdens on PFLPs have been reduced, those burdens should be reduced 
similarly for non-PFLP limited partnerships by applying the same reforms to them.229  
Second, many of the reforms proposed by the Law Commissions, and those 
subsequently proposed by the government in 2008-2009, should be adopted to equip all 
partnerships for the 21st century.  
 
The longer term solution is for legislators (and the civil service) to resist capture by 
interest groups such as private equity although, as discussed above, this may be unlikely 
without a fundamental change in political realities.230 If they choose not to, there are few 
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plausible enforcement options;231 greater judicial oversight of legislation232 is of limited 
efficacy in relation to legislation which has already been enacted at the behest of private 
equity; greater legislative oversight or periodic legislative review233 is unlikely where 
legislative capture has already occurred, and indeed the growing use of secondary 
legislation in the UK reduces legislative scrutiny; greater regulatory power234 cannot 
solve fundamental errors or omissions in the legislation; and greater localisation is 
neither likely nor appropriate in the context of UK financial services regulation or UK 
business law more generally.235 Although resisting capture would not, in fact, be difficult 
as a matter of personal choice on the part of an individual legislators or policymaker, the 
record to date suggests that it would be wise also to provide an alternative mechanism 
to counter legislative and policy capture, for example a formal role in legislative 
consultation for public interest organisations,236 including those representing small 
businesses. This could be based on the EU’s Economic and Social Committee, which has 
a mandatory consultative role in the EU’s legislative processes and includes 
representatives of employers, trade unions, and professional and community 
associations, among others. This would help to counter private equity’s influence and, as 
noted above, improve the quality of the law itself. 
 
Although the UK is under pressure to reduce regulatory and tax burdens because 
international investors seek those regimes which impose the lowest burdens and 
countries compete in this respect,237 the UK limited partnership offers the advantages of 
the UK’s “substantial body of case law and a highly-respected judiciary”238 and the 
flexibility of the common law with its judicial discretion,239 and there is no need for a 
race to the bottom as exemplified by the PFLP reforms. Instead, the UK should provide a 
gold standard of accountable and transparent regulation for the benefit of investors, 
employees and the wider economy. As the Walker Guidelines noted when proposing 
greater regulation of private equity, “the evolution of guidelines and standards for 
private equity have a potentially significant international dimension and may also have 
relevance for a wider group beyond the immediate confines of the private equity 
industry”.240 Equally, the evolution of UK partnership law freed from the constraints of 
private equity influence could have a positive impact on the wider range of businesses 
that use (or might use) the UK limited partnership structure. 
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